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Studies of industrial safety regulations, OSHA in particular, often find little effect on 
worker safety. Critics of the regulatory approach argue that safety standards have little to 
do with industrial injuries, and defenders of the regulatory approach cite infrequent 
inspections and low penalties for violating safety standards. We use recently assembled 
data from the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) concerning underground 
coal mine production, safety regulatory activities, and workplace injuries to shed new 
light on the regulatory approach to workplace safety. Because all underground coal mines 
are inspected at least once per quarter, MSHA regulations will not be ineffective because 
of infrequent inspections. We estimate over 200 different specifications of dynamic mine 
safety production functions, including ones using deliberately upward biased estimators, 
and cherry pick the most favorable mine safety effect estimates. Although most estimates 
are of insignificant MSHA effects, we select the single regression specification producing 
the most favorable MSHA impact from the agency viewpoint, which we then use in a 
policy evaluation. We address the question of whether it would be cost-effective to move 
some of MSHA’s enforcement budget into alternative programs that could also improve 
the health of the typical miner. Even using cherry picked results most favorable to the 
agency, MSHA is not cost effective at its current levels. Even though MSHA is a small 
program when judged against others like OSHA and EPA, MSHA’s targeted public 
health objective could be much better served (almost 700,000 life years gained on 
balance for typical miners) if a quarter of MSHA’s enforcement budget were reallocated 
to other programs such as more heart disease screening or defibrillators at worksites.      1
 
Data Mining Mining Data: MSHA Enforcement Efforts, Underground Coal Mine Safety, 
and New Health Policy Implications 
 
Thomas J. Kniesner and John D. Leeth 
     
1. Introduction 
   
There is much evidence that OSHA inspections have not been effective in reducing 
injuries (Kniesner and Leeth 1995, Chapters 1 and 2). One explanation is that there are 
too few OSHA safety inspections to make a difference to firms. OSHA inspections also 
might not matter much to worker safety because of low fines or irrelevant safety 
regulations. In contrast to the relatively infrequent OSHA inspections in construction or 
manufacturing, mines regulated by the Mine Safety and Health Administration (MSHA) 
are inspected quarterly. Also in contrast to OSHA inspections, mine safety inspectors can 
effect a work stoppage until a safety violation is corrected. We use recently assembled 
data on underground coal mine production, injuries, and safety inspection and other 
regulatory activity to examine econometrically the effectiveness of the regulatory 
approach to workplace safety where the law is potent and inspections frequent. We find 
that even if we cherry-pick results to maximize the estimated effectiveness of MSHA 
there is an excess of inspections in mining, which has a notable cost of foregone 
opportunities to improve the typical miner’s health through other existing means. 
    By way of background, the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969, as 
it is formally called, was the most comprehensive and stringent Federal legislation 
covering the mining industry. It included surface as well as underground coal mines, 
required two annual inspections of every surface coal mine and four at every 
underground coal mine, and greatly increased federal enforcement powers in coal mines. 
The Coal Act required monetary penalties for all violations and established criminal 
penalties for knowing and willful violations. The safety standards for all coal mines were 
strengthened and health standards adopted. The Coal Act included specific procedures for 
developing improved mandatory health and safety standards and established 
compensation for miners who were totally and permanently disabled by the by the 
progressive respiratory disease know as black lung. The annual enforcement budget of      2
 
MSHA is about 60 percent the size of OSHA’s, $110 million. (For more details see 
http://www.msha.gov).  
    A focal point of our research is to estimate an econometrically sophisticated 
regression model of the connection between mine inspections and mine safety outcomes. 
We adopt the general dynamic panel model of Arellano and Bond (1991), which 
incorporates sluggish adjustment between desired safety outcomes along with 
endogeneity of both production and safety policy at the mine level. We purposely 
examine a large number (200+) of econometric specifications, including ones deliberately 
biased upwards, so as to find maximal MSHA effects. 
    The dynamic quarterly unbalanced panel model we estimate is in sharp contrast to 
the empirical specifications in the existing literature. Previous work examines aggregate 
trends in injuries without covariates directly related to MSHA activities and attributes 
success to MSHA if a downward trend in coal mine injuries continued or accelerated 
after MSHA (Lewis-Beck and Alford 1980, Weeks 1995) or infers a positive effect of 
MSHA on mine safety if injuries are lower in the post-MSHA period without any 
consideration of the pre-MSHA pattern of injuries (Neumann and Nelson 1982, Fuess 
and Loewenstein 1990).
1 Our research is distinctive not only because we allow for a 
general background trend in mine injuries but also because  do not simply attribute 
unexplained changes in injuries to mine safety regulation as we have direct measures of 
safety regulation enforcement. 
    To summarize our results, we focus on estimates of the exogenous general 
deterrence effects of MSHA, which capture regulatory activities for the mine’s 
enforcement district. In only 1/200 specifications are the estimated MSHA effects on 
injuries negative and large relative to their standard errors. Purposely ignoring the issue 
that statistical significance is suspect when the data have been mined ex ante (Lovell 
1983), we then use the single set of parameter estimates most favorable to MSHA in a 
policy evaluation of the agency’s current regulatory activities. Even if a modest amount 
of MSHA’s relatively small enforcement budget, say 25 percent, were reallocated to 
other public health programs targeted to the demographic groups that are typically 
                                                 
1 For an examination of the effect of pre-MSHA state mining laws see Fishback (1992) and Boal (2003).      3
 
miners, there would be a substantial gain in health status of the target population (about 
700,000 additional life years). 
 
2. Estimates Needed to Calculate Cost-Effectiveness 
    We begin by describing the information needed to examine the cost-effectiveness 
of mine safety policy. We first answer the focal question of our research. What do we 
need to do econometrically with our newly constructed data set on underground coal 
mines to estimate the response parameters required for evaluating the workplace safety 
effects of MSHA? 
2.1 Effectiveness 
    Effective safety inspections can reduce deaths and injuries simultaneously. If 
totinj is the total number of injuries (fatal and non-fatal) then the algebraic expression for 
the economic benefit ( B) of reducing one workplace (mining) injury is the economic 
value of d(totinj) = -1, which is 
    (1) ff BVLVI aa =+- .                            (2.1) 
In (2.1) VL is the revealed value of life, VI is the revealed value of avoiding injury, and 
f a  and (1) f a -  are the proportions of injuries involving fatal versus non-fatal injuries in 
coal mining. The value of injury reduction is a weighted combination of the values placed 
on avoiding fatal and non-fatal injuries. 
2.2 Costs 
    Let wonum be the number of inspections per mine per quarter with at least one so-
called withdrawal order (the mine must remove workers from the mine) because of a 
serious safety or health violation. Next, let pennum be the number of inspections per mine 
per quarter with at least one monetary fine for a serious safety or health violation. If 
MSHA inspections neither ignore dangerous conditions nor concoct ones that do not exist 
then the only way for MSHA to improve safety in underground coal mines is to increase 
the number of inspections. The additional inspections would then result in more 
withdrawal orders or more monetary penalties per mine.  
    If I is the number of inspections per mine then the maximum safety impact of 









.  (2.2) 
In the case where the proportions of withdrawal order inspections and monetary penalty 









.                    (2.3) 
Because diminishing returns to inspecting mines may hold in reality, (2.3) produces a 
lower bound to the number of inspections it would take to eliminate one injury, which in 
turn means that calculations based on (2.3) may overstate the cost-effectiveness of 
MSHA, giving the benefit of the doubt to the agency. 
    The most important aspect of our research will be the safety outcomes regressions 
that yield estimates of  (/) totinjwonum ¶¶  and  (/) totinjpennum ¶¶ . Once we have 
regression estimates of the two partial derivatives we can set  ()1 dtotinj =-  in (2.3) and 
solve for dI to determine the number of additional MSHA inspections needed to eliminate 
one workplace injury, which is 
   










.                        (2.4) 
    To address the issue of cost effectiveness, we can  compare the cost of the 
additional inspections computed at the average cost, (ACdI · ), to the benefits of the 
additional inspections evaluated in (2.1). 
 
3. Conceptual Framework 
    It is helpful to place into an economic context of the  firm the two partial 
derivatives in (2.4) that are the primary components of the cost of MSHA safety 
enforcement activities. The small-scale economic model of the firm we present clarifies 
how to estimate econometrically the effectiveness of MSHA in a way that improves on 
the existing empirical literature concerning the cost-effectiveness of the regulatory 
approach to enhancing mine safety. 
    Consider a mine in year t with an (endogenous) optimal stock of health and safety 
capital per mine,  t q . We denote the workplace injury rate by  t IR . Job risk outcomes are      5
 
related to health and safety capital by the function  R(•), which is the inverse of the 
production function for worker safety, S(•), such that 
   
1 ()() ttt IRRqSq
- == .                             (3.1) 
In the typical situation safety capital is productive and regulation not counterproductive 
to the workplace safety environment ( 0 R¢£  and  /0 tt qm ¶¶‡ , with m a vector of MSHA 
activities) so that  (()) tt IRRqm =  and  /0 tt IRm ¶¶£ .
2 
    In the econometric specification of the inverse safety production function that we 
estimate we acknowledge that the impact of MSHA enforcement involves multiple 
activities, each of which can have non-linear effects described by the reverse S-shape 
depicted in Figure 1. In particular, we will allow the starting level of MSHA enforcement 
to condition its marginal effectiveness, such that more enforcement may be ineffective 
when starting from either very low or very high initial levels. The shape in Figure 1 also 
implies that reducing MSHA somewhat from very high initial levels can be cost-
effective. 
    Before we describe the econometric model and the resulting parameter estimates 
there are a few more conceptual details to flesh out in (3.1). First, safety capital wears 
out, as does all capital, so that  1 ()((1)) ttt RqRqq d - =D+- , where D indicates investment 
and d is the depreciation rate. It will also typically be the case that the function R(•) will 
be conditioned by the characteristics of workers and the technology contributing to 
injuries, such as worker safety training or scale of output (Viscusi 1992). Using  t Z  to 
represent the other econometrically includable conditioning factors, the inverse safety 
production function is 
    11 (,|) tttt IRRIRmZ -- = .                            (3.2) 
     The optimal amount of safety capital, q, at time t depends on its previous level 
and the firm’s desired investment in safety capital, both of which depend on previous 
injury levels and mine safety regulation enforcement,  1 t IR -  and  1 t m - . It is convenient to 
                                                 
2 Although we prefer the safety production function characterization (Viscusi 1992) as a way of thinking 
about the regression specifications to follow, the model is econometrically indistinguishable from the 
behavioral regulation approach (Scholtz and Gray 1990) and the optimizing social regulator approach 
(Auld et al. 2001).      6
 
think of the previous injury rate,  1 t IR - , as reflecting empirically the previous period’s 
stock of safety and health capital,  1 t q - . It will then be the case that  1 /0 tt IRm - ¶¶£  if 
(after allowing for threshold effects depicted in Figure 1) MSHA has its intended effects 
on workplace activities. Because we do not have direct observations on investment in 
safety capital,  t q D , the estimated effect of MSHA will reflect both the direct regulatory 
effect on safety plus any indirect effect through the agency’s impact on health and safety 
investments not reflected in  t Z  (Viscusi 1992).
3 
 
4. Econometric Background 
    The theoretical discussion of the last section emphasized the need for control 
covariates and dynamic adjustment to the ultimate equilibrium safety level, which leads 
naturally to the Arellano-Bond dynamic panel model that is summarized in general 
algebraic form as 







=++++ ￿   1,...,; iN =   1,...,, i tT =   (4.1) 
where  j a  are p parameters to be estimated,  it x  is a 1 · k1 vector of strictly exogenous 
covariates,  1 b  is a 1 · k1 vector of parameters to be estimated,  it w  is a 1 · k2 vector of 
predetermined covariates,  and  2 b  is a 1 · k2 vector of parameters to be estimated.
4 The 
i u  are random effects that are independent and identically distributed (iid) over mines 
with variance 
2
u s , and the overall errors,  it e , are iid over the whole sample with variance 
2
e s  and covariance  0 ue s =  for each mine over all time periods. When estimating the 
inverse safety production function of (3.2) with the Arellano-Bond estimator of (4.1) the 
dependent variable is a mine’s total injuries; the predetermined variables include 
production levels and mine-specific MSHA enforcement activities, and exogenous 
                                                 
3 When estimating (3.2) we allow for distributed lags in IR and m and treat both as endogenous. 
4 A strictly exogenous variable, xit, satisfies E[xiteis] = 0 for all t and s. A predetermined variable can have 
E[witeis] „ 0 for s > t but E[witeis] = 0 for all s £ t. Put simply, if the error term at time t has some feedback 
on later realizations of w, then w is a predetermined variable. The idea is that unforecastable errors today 
might affect future changes in w.      7
 
variables include mine district MSHA enforcement activities plus mine district and time 
dummies.  
    The Arellano-Bond estimator proceeds by first differencing (4.1), which removes 
i u  and leaves the equation estimable by instrumental variables. Arellano and Bond 
derived a GMM estimator for  j a  (j ˛ {1, …, p}), b1, and b2 using as instruments the 
lagged levels of the dependent variable and predetermined variables and differences of 
the strictly exogenous variables.
5 
    A practical problem w ith the Arellano-Bond estimator is that predetermined 
variables greatly increase the size of the instrument matrix. A very large instrument 
matrix makes GMM estimators perform poorly in small samples or makes the model 
inestimable.
6 
    It also is important  to note that there are two versions of the Arellano-Bond 
estimator, a one-step estimator and a two-step estimator, which adds additional 
complexity for the applied researcher. In the one-step estimator the Sargan test over-
rejects the overidentifying restrictions when there is heteroskedasticity. However, the 
standard errors of the two-step estimator are biased downward in small samples. So, the 
researcher generally uses both the one-step and two-step Arellano-Bond estimators, but 
for different purposes. The two-step results are better for model specification testing of 
the over-identifying restrictions, and the one-step results are better for inferences on the 
regression coefficients. Finally, it is important to note that the dynamic model in (4.1) is 
not identified if the dependent variable is persistent (a pure random walk makes lagged 
                                                 
5 We estimate our dynamic panel regressions using XTABOND from STATA. The model rests on no 
second-order autocorrelation in the first-differenced errors; the XTABOND routine produces so-called 
robust (to heteroskedasticity) standard errors, incorporates the needed tests for autocorrelation as well as 
the Sargan test of the overidentifying restrictions. The Sargan test is poorly sized, however, and difficult to 
pass when the instrument set is relatively large as in our case (Hall and Horowitz 1996, Ziliak 1997); it is 
therefore not surprising that none of the regressions we discuss pass the Sargan test. 
6 For illustration consider the case where the right-hand side of (4.1) contains exogenous variables, one 
lagged outcome,  yt-1, and no predetermined variables, so that in the estimated differenced form the 
regressors become Dxt and Dyt-1. At t = 3, y1 is a valid instrument, at t = 4, y1 and y2 are valid instruments, 
which adds another column to the instrument matrix Z, and so on, which are in addition to the columns for 
each x. More generally, if p is the number of lagged y’s in the model, i is the number of cross-section units, 
and T is the total number of time periods, then the number of columns in Z is  2 T i ip
- ￿ = . Predetermined 
variables are like lagged y’s in terms of adding columns to the instrument matrix. In our estimation we 
work with 1–8 lags of y, 1–3 predetermined variables, 1–206 x’s, with the maximum T = 55 and i = 3450, 
so that our models are often constrained by the maximum feasible width of Z in STATA.       8
 
levels of y weak instruments, and weak instruments lead to finite sample bias in panel 
instrumental variables models), so one should also test for a unit root in  yt before 




    To generate our data for estimation we merge five separate data sets provided by 
the Mine Safety and Health Administration covering inspections, violations, assessed 
penalties, injuries, and production and employment. The five data sets provide unique 
tracking numbers for each inspection, violation, and mine. Using the violations and 
inspections tracking numbers we link the information on assessed penalties and violations 
to information on inspections. We then combine enforcement information and quarterly 
data on production and employment based on mine identification numbers and beginning 
dates of the inspections. Likewise, we tie injury information to each mine and each 
quarter based on the date of injury and mine identification number.
8 The merged data set 
we use in estimation contains quarterly information on MSHA enforcement efforts and 
mining injuries, employment, and production during 1983–1997. 
    Although MSHA enforcement efforts may have an immediate effect on  the 
frequency or severity of accidents, they are unlikely to change the immediate incidence of 
health-related problems such as hearing loss or black-lung disease. Mine-related diseases 
develop gradually so that it is unlikely we can adequately determine the effect of MSHA 
enforcement efforts on miner health using information spanning the 15 years available. 
Accordingly, we exclude from the original data set all inspections focusing on health 
(such as inspections of a mine’s ventilation system or monitoring  for dust, noise or 
silica). To narrow our focus further to inspections likely to improve miner safety directly 
we also exclude all MSHA actions not on mine property, activities related to education 
and training, investigations for discrimination, and audits of accident, injury, illness, and 
employment records. In every case where we exclude an inspection or MSHA activity we 
likewise exclude the resulting citations, orders, and penalties. 
                                                 
7 Simple and augmented Dickey-Fuller tests (Greene 2003, Chapter 20) reject the null hypothesis of a unit 
root in totinjt, our focal dependent variable. 
8 Because MSHA does not list contractor production, employment, and injury data separately for each mine 
we exclude outside contractors from our research.      9
 
    Figures 2–4 depict the history of mine safety, including the quarterly data in our 
estimation sample. What the annual data in Figure 2 show is that MSHA, as it post-dates 
the 1969 Coal Act, may have had its intended effect of improving safety, at least where 
fatal injuries are concerned. Figure 3 also reveals the possibility that non-fatal injuries too 
may be affected by MSHA, most recently since the mid-1980s. Finally, Figure 4, which 
plots the quarterly data in our estimation sample of 1983–1997, emphasizes the 
seasonality of injuries as well as supports the possibility that MSHA has been effective in 
reducing miner injuries since the middle 1980s. 
    Table 1 presents summary statistics on MSHA safety-related enforcement 
activities directed at coal mines operating during 1983–1997.
9 All monetary figures have 
been adjusted to reflect inflation to 2002. The first two panels provide information on 
individual citations and orders to withdraw miners from the worksite, the third panel 
reports MSHA penalties per inspection, and the last two panels provide total enforcement 
efforts per quarter. 
    Panels A and B of Table 1 reveal that most, but not all, MSHA penalties were 
imposed for serious violations of health and safety standards. About 60 percent of 
citations and 57 percent of withdrawal orders were issued for violations that MSHA 
inspectors viewed as significant and substantial, or likely to result in injury. 
    With an average of $184, initial fines on citations were fairly small. Fines on 
withdrawal orders were considerably larger, averaging $2,079, although only 60 percent 
of w ithdrawal orders imposed a separate monetary penalty.
10 MSHA adjusted initial 
penalties downward over time. Monetary penalties on withdrawal orders fell from their 
initial amounts an average of 39 percent and monetary penalties on citations fell from 
their initial amounts an average of about 14 percent. 
    The degree of operator negligence may at least partially explain the much larger 
average fine on withdrawal orders than on citations. Approximately 88 percent of the 
violations resulting in a withdrawal order were classified by MSHA inspectors as caused 
by a high degree of operator negligence or reckless disregard of mine safety, whereas 
                                                 
9 We define a mine as operating in a quarter if it employed at least one hour of labor. 
10 In many cases the monetary penalty for a violation resulting in a withdrawal order is added to a previous 
citation.      10
 
only about two percent of the violations resulting in the issuance of a citation were 
caused by a high degree of operator negligence or reckless disregard of miner safety. 
    Besides a monetary penalty, withdrawal orders also shut down production, which 
imposes a potentially large cost if operations are disrupted for an extended period. At 
least fifty percent of the withdrawal orders were terminated fairly quickly, in one day or 
less, but for a sizable number the days from issuance to termination extended for weeks 
and, in some cases, months and years. Because of the extremes the average number of 
days from issuance to termination is large, 32.2 days. Appendix A provides additional 
details of the distribution of lost days. As shown, 25 percent of all withdrawal orders 
from 1983 to 1997 extended for 6 days or more and 5 percent extended for 112 days or 
more. With such a potentially long shut down period, mines had strong incentives to 
avoid conditions likely to result in withdrawal orders. Additionally, the harsh penalties 
shown in Appendix A for failure to abate and imminent danger hazards likely motivated 
mines to rectify previously discovered problems and avoid conditions liable to result in 
death or severe injury. By way of contrast, the incentives to avoid citations resulting only 
in monetary penalties were quite small. From 1983 to 1997, 95 percent of all citations 
had initial fines less than $447 and 99 percent had initial fines less than $1,158. By law 
mines must continue to pay miners for the remainder of the shift during which a 
withdrawal order is issued and for up to 4 hours the next day if the withdrawal order is 
still in effect, meaning that the monetary losses from a withdrawal order almost always 
substantially exceed the losses from a simple citation resulting in a fine. 
    As can be seen in Panel C of Table 1, about 40 percent of MSHA safety 
inspections led to a monetary penalty, and about five percent of inspections resulted in a 
withdrawal order. About 31 percent of all inspections uncovered at least one serious 
violation of MSHA health and safety standards, and about five percent of inspections 
discovered at least o ne violation with a high degree of operator negligence. For 
inspections where a monetary penalty was imposed the initial fines for all citations and 
withdrawal orders issued during the inspection averaged $1,503. Over time, the monetary 
penalties fell by about 14 percent on average.  
    Panel D of Table 1 presents MSHA enforcement efforts per quarter. The average 
operating coal mine was inspected for safety-related problems 4–5 times per quarter but      11
 
had slightly less than two inspections per quarter resulting in monetary penalties and 
0.211 inspections per quarter resulting in withdrawal orders. Per inspection with fines, 
the average monetary penalty for all violations was $1,263. On average, MSHA reduced 
monetary penalties by about 16 percent from initial levels.  
    Finally, Panel E of Table 1 indicates quarterly enforcement efforts with all minor 
violations excluded, which are violations that MSHA inspectors believe are unlikely to 
result in injury. MSHA can improve miner safety  to the extent that inspectors can 
identify serious violations of safety standards, violations likely to result in injury. MSHA 
discovered serious violations of safety standards in a large majority of mines each 
quarter. Slightly more than 71 percent of all mines received at least one monetary penalty 
for a serious violation of safety standards. Per quarter, the average operating coal mine 
had about 1.4 inspections resulting in monetary penalties for serious violations, 0.11 
inspections resulting in withdrawal orders, and 0.18 inspections with one or more high 
degree of operator negligence violations. The average fine in a quarter for mines with 
serious violations that receive monetary penalties was $1,442. Over time monetary 
penalties fell on average by about 17 percent.  
 
6. Econometric Results 
    We now describe the large number of specifications of a dynamic mine safety 
equation that we estimated. In contrast to Sala-I-Martin (1997) who examines several 
million regressions to find the true model of country growth, we search among a large 
number of regressions to find the single set of results the most favorable to MSHA. We 
then use our shamelessly data mined results in best-case calculations of the cost 
effectiveness of MSHA and it implications for improving the health and safety of the 
population typically working as miners. 
    Our research also is similar to a meta-analysis on one data set because in the 
process of estimating a large number of econometric specifications we will as a by-
product see if a pattern emerges with regards to the effectiveness of MSHA in influencing 
miner safety. The large number of regression specifications (200+) comes about because 
we consider various (1) safety measures (total injuries, injury rate, fatal injuries, non-fatal 
injuries, zero versus some injuries), (2) MSHA activities (specific abatement, general      12
 
deterrence, both), (3) instrument sets (small, medium, large), (4) time frames (quarterly, 
annual), (5) distributed lag structures (1, 4, and 8 quarters), (6) output measures 
(production, labor hours), (7) degrees of non-linearity in MSHA effects (linearity, cubic, 
orthogonal polynomials), (8) time effects (yes, no), (9) location effects (yes, no), (10) 
non-exogeneity of MSHA’s mine-specific abatement activities (yes, no), and (11) 
estimation techniques  (GMM, OLS, Tobit, Heckit, count models). The conclusion 
emerging is that the results in the overwhelming number of cases are unfavorable to the 
safety enhancement objective of MSHA at current levels of regulation. 
6.1 Key Regression Variables 
    Table 2 presents definitions of the regression variables. In using the Arellano-
Bond dynamic panel model (4.1) on our quarterly mining data the focal dependent 
variable is totinjit, which is the number of workers in quarter t at mine i that have a lost-
workday injury, including death. Exogenous variables include quarterly time dummies 
and mine district location dummies, which are described in Appendix B. Always treated 
as predetermined is our primary measure of mining activity, the log of total employee 
hours worked, lhourit. 
    We consider three specifications for MSHA activities: models with general (mine-
district level) deterrence measures, models with specific (to the mine itself) deterrence 
measures, and models with both general and specific deterrence measures. Here the 
vector  m(general)it  ” [ lindamtit,  pennumit,  wonumit], where  lindamt is the log of the 
mine’s enforcement district average monetary penalty per inspection with monetary 
penalty (calculated excluding mine  i),  pennum is the mine’s enforcement district’s 
inspections per mine with monetary penalty (excluding mine i), and wonum is the mine’s 
enforcement district’s inspections per mine with withdrawal order (excluding mine i). 
The vector m(specific)it ” [posnumit, sumwoit], where posnum is the mine’s number of 
inspections with monetary penalties, and sumwo is the mine’s number of inspections with 
withdrawal orders.
11 So, when estimating the dynamic panel model of mine injuries (4.1) 
we examine specifications where  m(general) is part of  x and specifications where 
                                                 
11 All penalties (monetary and withdrawal orders) are for violations of standards deemed serious  or 
substantial where the likelihood of an injury occurring is viewed to be likely, highly likely, or has already 
occurred.      13
 
m(specific) is part of w and include up to four lagged values of both y and m on the right-
hand side for symmetry in dynamic adjustment in y to past shocks and policy changes. 
    To fix ideas, the prototypical model specification we estimate is 








D=D+D+D++D ￿￿￿ ,         (6.1) 
where general deterrence is part of x1, specific deterrence is part of  w and time and 
location effects are conditioned out in x2. Although one can consider the dynamic patterns 
in coal mine injuries here we are generally interested in equilibrium multiplier effects of 







￿ ),  k = 1, 2.  
6.2 Focal Regression 
    We could not produce a single regression using mine-specific abatement measures 
that had an estimated negative effect for MSHA, which we attribute to the inability of the 
instrumental variables approach to correct for the endogeneity of MSHA whereby 
additional injuries in a mine trigger additional inspections. Regressions with specific 
deterrence regressors that parallel our focal  regression in terms of specification and 
instrument sets appear in Appendix C. For our subsequent cost-effectiveness calculations 
we selected the only regression from over 200 we estimated that simultaneously satisfied 
the following criteria: computational feasibility (maximum lag length for an instrument is 
15 quarters), quarterly data; time and location dummies; four-quarter lags on the injury 
rate, production, and MSHA; at least one negatively signed MSHA coefficient that is 
1.68 times its standard error; and the estimated equilibrium impact effect of MSHA is 
also negative ( ˆ 0 j jb < ￿ ).
12 
    The only (one-step Arellano and Bond) regression that satisfied the intersection of 
our model selection criteria just described produced the following result, where underline 
indicates that the coefficient was 1.68 times its (robust) standard error: 
 
                                                 
12 Remember that the 5 percent nominal significance level for a one-sided hypothesis test is only a heuristic 
because of the large amount of data mining behind the regression result. A useful approximate result 
described in Lovell (1983) for the connection between the true and claimed levels of significance is that 
a(claimed) = ( k/c)  ·  a(true), where a search has been conducted for the best k out of  c candidate 
explanatory variables’ coefficients.      14
 
Dtotinjt = 0.39Dtotinjt-1 + 0.15Dtotinjt-2 + 0.06Dtotinjt-3 + 0.04Dtotinjt-4 
+ 1.10Dlhourt – 0.07Dlhourt-1 – 0.06Dlhourt-2 – 0.04Dlhourt-3 – 0.06Dlhourt-4 
– 0.01Dlindamt – 0.02Dlindamt-1 – 0.01Dlindamt-2 + 0.03Dlindamt-3 + 0.02Dlindamt-4 
– 0.04Dpenumt – 0.04Dpenumt-1 – 0.12Dpenumt-2 + 0.04Dpenumt-3 + 0.06Dpenumt-4 
– 0.08Dwonumt – 0.73Dwonumt-1 + 0.07Dwonumt-2 + 0.29Dwonumt-3 – 0.45Dwonumt-4 
+ g1 time dummies + g2 location dummies.                  (6.2) 
      hlindam = 0.015, hpenum = -0.25, hwonum = -0.16 
      P(No 1
st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(No 2
nd order serial correlation) = 0.11 
 
Our focal regression (6.2) yields an equilibrium impact multiplier for lindam  that is 
small, positive and statistically insignificant (which we will subsequently ignore in our 
policy simulations), an equilibrium impact multiplier for penum that is –0.31, which 
implies an elasticity at the means of  – 0.25, and an equilibrium impact multiplier for 
wonum that is -2.53, which implies an elasticity at the means of – 0.16.
13 Interestingly, 
both of the estimated MSHA effects in (6.2) are close to the results in Scholtz and Gray 
(1990) for the general deterrence effects of OSHA. 
 
7. MSHA Cost-Effectiveness Calculations 
    Before considering the economic and policy implications of our results we note 
that some might view omitting possible health improvements from MSHA inspection 
activities as a gap in our research. In 1970, the year after passage of the Coal Mine Act, 
the number of death listings with any mention of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis (black 
lung disease) was 2,189; by 1996 the number of death listings had dropped 35 percent to 
1,417 (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1991, 1999). The incidence of 
coal workers’ pneumoconiosis fell even more dramatically than the number of death 
                                                 
13 To try to enlarge the estimated effect of MSHA we have also estimated the statistically most biased 
dynamic panel regression models, which are OLS, IV fixed effects and IV first-differences (Blundell, 
Bond, and Windmeijer 2000; Bond 2002). In the IV fixed effects results no general deterrence coefficient 
was at least 1.68 times its standard error, and the results from IV first differences did not satisfy the basic 
stability condition that  j j a ￿  < 1 . OLS results yield no coefficient for either lindam or penum that is both 
negative and at least 1.68 times its standard error and ˆwonum h = - 0.19. Finally, the estimated effects of 
MSHA are positive when we smooth our quarterly data by annualizing it.      15
 
listings. During the first round of the NIOSH Coal Workers’ X -Ray Surveillance 
Program (1970–1973), 11 percent of miners had some form of  coal workers’ 
pneumoconiosis. During the sixth round of surveillance (1992–1996), 2.8 percent of 
miners had some form of coal workers’ pneumoconiosis, which is about a 75 percent 
drop from the initial level (U.S. Department of Health and Human Services 1999). 
Although MSHA may have been a factor in improving miner health, other factors may 
also have contributed, such as improvements in technology, union efforts, greater worker 
awareness, and even reductions in smoking incidence.  
Attempting to disentangle all the potential influences on miner health would be 
difficult econometrically, to say the least. Even more problematic would be trying to 
relate health improvements to specific inspections given the long lag-time between 
worker exposure and any signs of worker ill health. Our research, therefore, focuses on 
the impact of MSHA general and safety-related inspections on miner safety. We exclude 
from our empirical work enforcement activities not on mine property, including computer 
generated dust sampling, education and training activities, and inspections geared 
specifically toward health issues. Because general and safety-related inspections uncover 
few health-related problems, changes in the number of the inspections we examine 
should have little impact on miner health.
14 
7.1 Baseline Values 
    We now turn our attention to the arithmetic details of safety inspections’ costs and 
benefits. Viscusi (1993) and Viscusi and Aldy (2002) argue that the range of reasonable 
value-of-life estimates is from $3 million to $ 7 million and that the value of a lost 
workday injury is about $50,000 ($1990). The highest reported implicit value of injury in 
Viscusi (1993) is Biddle and Zarkin’s (1988) estimate based on willingness to accept, 
$131,495. We base our calculations of the costs and effectiveness of MSHA on the 
estimates of the economic losses from fatal and non-fatal injuries just mentioned. 
                                                 
14 In our estimation sample we have data on 499,940 serious violations of MSHA standards (violations 
believed to result in injury). Of the almost half million violations in our data 94 percent were discovered 
during either general or safety related inspections and six percent were found during other  MSHA 
enforcement activities. In the inspections in our estimation sample, over 99 percent of the citations were for 
safety violations.      16
 
7.2 Benefits 
    During 1983–1997 there were 428 fatalities and 91,773 nonfatal lost workday 
injuries in our estimation sample. The proportion of fatal injuries in all injuries was 
0.0046, and the corresponding proportion of nonfatal lost workday injuries in all injuries 
was 0.9954. The value of reducing one injury established earlier in (2.1) is  
  VI VL B 9954 . 0 0046 . 0 + = ,                            (7.1) 
where VL is the value of a life saved, and VI is the value of an injury prevented. 
    Using the highest value of life and value of injury figures mentioned above so as 
to make the gains from MSHA as large as possible, the benefit of reducing an injury in 
underground coal mines (converted to $2002) is 
  0.00469,447,0000.9954176,800$219,443 B =·+·= .             (7.2) 
7.3 Costs  
    In Section 6 we located the one of approximately 200 regressions with the largest 
significant estimated effects of  wonum and  pennum. Based on our cherry picked 
regression the largest possible injury reducing effect of inspections leading to a 
























= .  (7.5) 
                                                 
15 Attempts to find subtle threshold effects of the type depicted in Figure 1 were mostly unsuccessful so our 
calculations use a constant value for the impact of MSHA. The cubic in MSHA that will capture the non-
linearity of threshold effects also produces collinearity among m, m
2, and m
3 that necessitates the use of 
orthogonal polynomials regression. In the orthogonal polynomials regressions paralleling (6.1) the only 
polynomials with a coefficient whose value exceeded 1.0 were for Dwonumt-3 and Dwonumt-4, and in both 
cases the coefficients (of Dwonum
2(t-3) and Dwonum(t-4)) were negative, which is contrary to the possible 
ineffectiveness of MSHA at relatively high or low levels of enforcement depicted in Figure 1. On the other 
hand we also estimated simple dynamic censored (ZINB, Tobit, and Heckit) regression models that take 
explicit account of the fact that about 50 percent of the observations on the dependent variable are zero. 
The results show that MSHA has no effect at the extensive margin and all of its effect is at the intensive      17
 
From 1983 to 1997 for the mines in our estimation sample there were 6,249 
inspections with at least one withdrawal order for a serious violation, 79,888 inspections 
with a monetary penalty for at least one serious violation, and 252,411 inspections. The 
fraction of withdrawal order inspections in all inspections was 0.0248, and the fraction of 
monetary penalty inspections in all inspections was 0.3165. In the last quarter of 1997 the 
number of mines that had been operating for at least 5 quarters (the minimum necessary 
to be in the estimation sample) was 572. 
Substituting the inspection and mines’ operating numbers into equations (7.4) and 
(7.5) and then substituting the derivatives of equations (7.4) and (7.5) with respect to I 




dtotinjdIdIdIdI =--=--.  (7.6) 
Setting  d(totinj) =  -1 and solving for  dI, we determine the number of additional 
inspections MSHA would need to eliminate one workplace injury. Using the upper bound 
regression results from Section 6 produces a lower bound for dI = 3,584.  
We have MSHA  supplied information on inspector time for 99 percent of the 
252,411 inspections of the underground coal mines in our estimation sample. Time is 
broken down into four categories:  travel, report writing, surface inspections, and 
mechanized mining unit inspections. For the total sample the average and median total 
inspection times were 29.8 hours and 8 hours. Excluding the longest 1 percent of 
inspections by total time, the average and median inspection lengths were 24.7 hours and 
8 hours. 
According to the Position Classification Standard for Mine Safety and Health, 
GS-1822, a starting underground coal mine inspector would have a government service 
classification of 9. In 2001, GS-9, step 1 received an hourly wage of $15.93 
(http://www.opm.gov/oca/01tables/gshrly/html/01gshr.htm).  
Ignoring overhead costs and using the median inspection length, the minimum 
cost of the 3,584 additional inspections needed to reduce total coal mine injuries by one 
would then be (in $2002) equal to 3,5848$16.17$463,966 ··= . 
                                                                                                                                                 
margin, which is imply that at low levels of injury MSHA is ineffective at reducing injuries (to zero). For 
econometric background on sophisticated censored dynamic panel models see Hu (2002).       18
 
7.4 Cost/Benefit 
    What then is the cost-benefit ratio when we ignore the fact that we cherry-picked 
regression results to get the most favorable impact of MSHA and in turn use the least 
possible cost of an inspection? The estimated cost of eliminating an injury  is $463,966 
and the benefit from eliminating an injury is $219,443. The implied cost/benefit ratio for 
the most favorable case we can construct for MSHA is about 2.1 > 1. At current levels 
safety inspections are not cost-beneficial. 
7.5 Cost of Reducing One Fatality 
    We might also address the cost-effectiveness issue somewhat differently and 
focus on either reducing fatalities in isolation or on reducing non-fatal injuries in 
isolation. Because 0.46 percent of all injuries are fatalities, to eliminate a fatality one 
would require reducing total injuries by 1/0.0046 = 217. Because few injuries in mining 
are fatal, equation (6.6) indicates that the number of additional inspections required to 
eliminate one miner death would then be 779,155. Evaluated at the median time per 
inspection the cost of eliminating one fatality would be 779,156  · 8  · $16.18 = 
$100,865,530. 
    As a reference point for comparison and evaluation we can consider that 
regulatory allocations involve an opportunity cost as they impose real financial costs on 
consumers and taxpayers because the money spent on regulatory costs would otherwise 
be spent on other bundles of consumer commodities. Based on such risk-risk tradeoff 
considerations, economists have estimated that when government agencies  propose risk 
reducing regulations that impose a cost per life saved at levels of about $69 million or 
more ($2002), then on balance the regulation is harming individual health (Viscusi 1994, 
1998). So, it is important to recognize that the MSHA cost of saving a life is about 1.5 
times the cutoff point for an acceptable life-saving regulation from broad social 
perspective that a policy analyst should use. 
    To put the amount of additional inspections needed to reduce fatalities by one into 
perspective (again ignoring the general lack of statistical significance of MSHA safety 
inspections), in 1997 the total coal enforcement budget for MSHA was $107 million 
(Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 1999). In 1997 there were 72,390      19
 
inspections of coal mines.
16 The total cost per inspection in 1997 was therefore $1,478, 
which includes more than just labor cost of the inspector. In $2002, the cost of 
eliminating one fatality would then be 779,156 · $1,501  @ $1.17 billion, which is over 
10 times the annual enforcement budget. Put differently, the increase in inspections 
needed to eliminate one miner death is more than 10 times the total number of 
inspections now conducted by MSHA.  
7.6 Cost of Reducing One Injury 
    To eliminate one non-fatal injury would require an additional 3,601 inspections 
using equation (7.6). The lower bound estimate of eliminating a non-fatal injury using the 
median inspection time and the average cost per inspection is then 3,601 · 8 · $16.18 = 
$466,167, which is over 2.6 times the estimated benefit of an injury foregone. 
 
8. Discussion: Policy Implications for Miners’ Health 
    It has frequently been suggested that regulatory programs be subjected to 
continued OMB review for cost and effectiveness (Kniesner and Viscusi 2003 and 
references therein). We close with an example of how a cost-effectiveness review could 
be applied to MSHA because it may help to frame the policy implications of our 
empirical results. It will make things more transparent, too, to recast our estimated 
MSHA effects in terms of life years gained, on balance, if some of the MSHA 
enforcement budget were reallocated to a few identifiable programs likely to affect the 
health of miners. 
8.1 Cost Per Life Year Saved by MSHA 
    As we have noted, the proportion of fatal injuries to all injuries is 0.0046, and the 
proportion of nonfatal lost workday injuries to all injuries is 0.9954. Totinj combines 
both fatal and nonfatal lost workday injuries. The number of lost life years saved from 
reducing one injury is then 
  injury)   nonfatal    to due   years lost  ( 9954 . 0   death)    to due   years lost  ( 0046 . 0 · + · = B . 
    The average age of miners killed on the job in the estimation sample is 37.9. 
Based on life expectancy tables posted at the National Center for Health Statistics the 
                                                 
16 MSHA supplies inspection data for underground, surface, and mills – including mandatory inspections      20
 
remaining life expectancy of a 38 year old is 40.7 years. Using a 5 percent real interest 
rate (as applied in Tengs et al. 1995) the discounted number of life years saved from 
avoiding one mining death is then 17.3. 
The average days lost from work due to a nonfatal injury in the estimation sample 
is 39.17. We calculate average days lost replacing reported days lost with statutory days 
lost for all permanent total or permanent partial disabilities with reported days lost of 
zero. On average, a miner loses 0.107 of a work year from a nonfatal injury. Substituting 
17.3 for lost years due to death and 0.107 for lost years due to nonfatal injury into the 
equation above, the number of life years saved for every miner injury avoided is 0.186. 
    From previous calculations, the minimum cost of avoiding one injury using 
government inspectors’ salary rates expressed in $2002 is $463,996. Combining results, 
the least cost per life year saved estimate in $2002 is $463,996 ÷ 0.186 = $2,494,602.
17  
8.2 Improving Health for the Target Population 
    Our estimates imply that using the most optimistic estimated effects from Section 
7, it costs about $2,500,000 per life year gained via MSHA enforcement activities. The 
appropriate public policy issue, then, is whether there are cheaper ways to improve the 
health of the population overall or of miners in particular. 
    A rich source of information for our ultimate policy evaluation exercise is again 
Tengs et al. (1995), who calculate government cost per life year gained for 500 health 
enhancing interventions. If one takes a transcendental view that a life year is a life year 
no matter whose it is, then there are many programs Tengs et al. discover that have a per 
life year cost of nearly $0.
18 Suppose in addition to budget neutrality we add the second 
consideration that any movement of resources out of MSHA’s safety enforcement budget 
be put into programs likely to affect persons with the demographic characteristics of the 
                                                                                                                                                 
and investigations, enforcement activities not on mine property, and education and training evaluations. 
17 Tengs et al. (1995) only consider reducing mortality risks. Based on our calculations the marginal cost of 
reducing one fatality is at least $375,471,940 in 2002 dollars. Dividing by 17.3 (the number of discounted 
life years), the cost per life year saved by reducing only mortality risk is then about $21,703,580. 
18 A short list includes installing car windshields with adhesive bonding instead of rubber gaskets, laws 
requiring smoke detectors in homes, mandatory motorcycle helmet laws, banning residential growth in 
tsunami-prone areas, banning sale of three-wheel ATVs, rubella vaccinations for children age two, and 
smoking cessation advice for pregnant women who smoke. For the interested reader we note that the most 
expensive programs per life year gained ($2002) include sickle cell screening for non-black low risk 
newborns ($42 billion) and applying chloroform limits on private wells to emissions at the 48 worst case 
pulp mills ($123 billion).      21
 
typical miner. What net gain in health, as measured by life years, could be obtained by 
moving 25 percent of MSHA’s enforcement budget (having one fewer inspection per 
mine per year) into alternative programs that could benefit the population of miners? The 
results are surprising despite the relative small budgetary level of MSHA. 
    MSHA is small relative to other well-known regulatory agencies. In recent years 
the overall budget of OSHA has been 1.7 times the budget of MSHA, and the annual 
budget of the EPA has been 24.6 times the budget of MSHA. Let us just consider now the 
annual enforcement budget of MSHA, which is about $110 million. One-fourth of the 
MSHA enforcement budget is $27.5 million. At a cost of $2,500,000 per life year, a 25 
percent reduction in MSHA inspections would reduce life years by about 11, which is 
less than one statistical miner’s life. Using the list in Tengs et al. (1995), programs that 
could affect the health of persons who might be in the population of miners would 
include more heart disease screening or more on-site defibrillators, as suggested recently 
by OMB, which would each produce a life year at a cost of $40. So, moving $27.5 
million from the MSHA enforcement budget into more heart disease screening or 
defibrillators would gain on balance 687,489 = (687,500 – 11) life years for the affected 
population, which is equivalent to about 16,800 statistical miners’ lives. 
    The point of the exercise is to demonstrate that even a program as small as MSHA 
can have relatively large opportunity costs. We have shown that a modest amount of 
reallocation of program expenditures can make a substantial improvement in the public 
health of the target population. Although there are specific mandates via OSHA and 
MSHA addressing workplace health and safety, funding levels for OSHA and MSHA and 
their target activities are legislative decisions. As policy  analysts, we argue for cost-
effective government policy in the area of promoting health and longevity. Our estimates 
demonstrate the sizeable potential gain in miners’ health from budgetary reallocation to 
other existing programs. We believe our estimates clearly imply a need for government to 
take a more transcendental view by considering public health more generally and 
consider more comprehensively the options available to improve the health of the 
working population.      22
 










th  95th  Max  Number
1 
All    32.2  167.2  0  1  6  112  4,656  36,704 
Failure to abate  104B  59.4  221.5  0  3  25  282  4,633  8,651 
Unwarrantable 
failure to comply  104D1  22.9  121.8  0  1  5  52  3,431  8,186 
Subsequent similar   104D2  15.3  125.8  0  0  2  26  1,777  13,781 
Imminent danger  107A  43.9  202.6  0  1  8  178  4,656  6,086 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations.   
 
1 Withdrawal orders lacking termination dates are excluded from the calculations.       23
 
Appendix B: Enforcement Districts 
 
    The enforcement of MSHA standards is divided between the Coal Mine Safety 
and Health and Metal and Nonmetal Mine Safety and Health groups. In turn the groups 
are broken down into enforcement districts (11 in coal and 6 metal and nonmetal) and 
field offices (65 in coal and 50 metal and nonmetal). The 11 coal mining enforcement 
districts are: 
District 1    Anthracite coal mining regions in Pennsylvania 
District 2    Bituminous coal mining regions in Pennsylvania 
District 3    Maryland, Ohio, and Northern West Virginia 
District 4    Southern West Virginia 
District 5    Virginia 
District 6    Eastern Kentucky 
District 7    Central Kentucky, North Carolina, South Carolina, and Tennessee 
District 8    Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Michigan, Minnesota, Northern Missouri, and 
Wisconsin 
District 9  All states west of the Mississippi River, except Minnesota, Iowa, and 
Northern Missouri 
District 10  Western Kentucky 
District 11  Alabama, Georgia, Florida, Mississippi, Puerto Rico, and Virgin Islands 
 
Besides conducting inspections, the regional offices also review mine plans for 
safety concerns. The mine operator devises appropriate engineering plans and then the 
engineering specialists at MSHA review and approve the proposed plans. Once approved, 
the mine operator must follow the plans. Specific areas include control of mine roof and 
ventilation system.  
District managers are responsible for supervising inspectors in their districts. 
MSHA has acknowledged that there is inconsistency in how inspectors interpret 
standards. To help remedy the problem, it has established a District Managers Council 
(DMC) which meets quarterly to discuss and try to correct enforcement inconsistencies. 
The Office of Assessments determines the size of monetary penalties. The criteria 
for penalties include the size of the business, the seriousness of the violation, and the 
degree of the mine operator’s negligence. When a major accident is reported, the district 
manager dispatches MSHA personnel to  the site. The mine operator has control and 
responsibility for rescue efforts but must seek approval from MSHA for actions taken.      24
 
In a report by the Office of the Inspector General on metal/nonmetal mining 
enforcement and compliance assistance activities it was recommended that MSHA should 
improve guidance to district offices regarding program implementation and operation to 
enhance consistency in program performance and management. The report also found 
disparities in the inspector resources available per mine on a district basis. Factors that 
should be considered in allocating inspector resources include mine size, geographic 
clustering, and travel time. The report also discovered that the mix of activities between 
enforcement and compliance assistance fluctuated among the districts and within a 
district from year to year. There was no consensus among district managers about the 
relative effectiveness of enforcement activities and compliance-oriented activities. All of 
the district managers believed both types of activities had merit but the difficulty was 
allocating time between activities. (Mine Safety and Health Administration 2001.)                                                                                                                                         25 
Appendix C: General Deterrence Regressions* 
Dtotinjt  =  0.32Dtotinjt-1 + 0.12Dtotinjt-2 + 0.02Dtotinjt-3 – 0.01Dtotinjt-4 
      + 0.56Dlhourt – 0.23Dlhourt-1 – 0.04Dlhourt-2 – 0.02Dlhourt-3 – 0.01Dlhourt-4 
      + 0.26Dposnmt – 0.13Dposnmt-1 – 0.08Dposnmt-2 – 0.04Dposnmt-3 – 0.04Dposnmt-4 
      – 0.25Dsumwo t + 0.08Dsumwot-1 – 0.02Dsumwot-2 – 0.05Dsumwot-3 – 0.09Dsumwo t-4 
      + g1 time dummies + g2 location dummies.                  (C.1) 
hposnum = -0.043 , hsumwo = -0.041 
P(no 1
st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(no 2
nd order serial correlation) = 0.17 
Dtotinjt  =  0.32Dtotinjt-1 + 0.12Dtotinjt-2 + 0.02Dtotinjt-3 – 0.01Dtotinjt-4 
      + 0.52Dlhourt – 0.22Dlhourt-1 – 0.04Dlhourt-2 – 0.03Dlhourt-3 – 0.01Dlhourt-4 
      + 0.29Dposnmt – 0.13Dposnmt-1 – 0.07Dposnmt-2 – 0.03Dposnmt-3 – 0.03Dposnmt-4 
      – 0.26Dsumwo t + 0.12Dsumwot-1 + 0.01Dsumwo t-2 – 0.02Dsumwot-3 – 0.07Dsumwo t-4 
      – 0.03Dlindamt – 0.03Dlindamt-1 – 0.03Dlindamt-2 + 0.03Dlindamt-3 – 0.0004Dlindmt-4  
      – 0.16Dpenumt – 0.11Dpenumt-1 – 0.14Dpenumt-2 – 0.0003Dpenumt-3 – 0.10Dpenumt-4 
      – 0.02Dwonumt – 0.68Dwonumt-1 + 0.09Dwonumt-2 + 0.27Dwonumt-3 – 0.52Dwonumt-4 
      + g1 time dummies + g2 location dummies.                  (C.2)  
      hposnum = 0.048 , hsumwo = -0.027, hlindam = -0.058, hpenum =  -0.76, hwonum = -0.10. 
      P(no 1
st order serial correlation) = 0.00, P(no 2
nd order serial correlation) = 0.17 
*underline indicates that the coefficient was 1.68 times its (robust) standard error     26
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Table 1. MSHA Enforcement Activities, All Active Underground Coal Mines, 1983-1997 
 
    Mean/  Median  Standard  Minimum  Maximum 
  Percent      Deviation 
 
A.  Citations (Observations = 971,117) 
Initial fine ($2002)    $184  $115  $526  $18  $66,043   
Reduction of fine from initial level  13.7%  0%  35.0%  -3493%  100%   
Serious violation    60.4%           
High degree of operator negligence  2.4%
1           
 
B.  Withdrawal Orders  (Observations = 37,205) 
Initial fine ($2002)
2    $2,079  $1,214  $4,132  $26  $68,822   
Reduction of fine from initial level
2  39.0%  0%  46.4%  -665%  100%   
Serious violation    56.9%           
High degree of operator negligence
3  88.4%
3           
Days from issuance to termination
4  32.2  1  167.2  0  4,656 
 
C.  Safety-Related Inspections (Observations = 371,684) 
Monetary penalty imposed  40.2%           
Total initial fine ($2002) for all   $1,503  $320  $6,911  $26  $713,260   
violations found
5 
Reduction of fine from initial level
5  13.9%  0%  34.9%  -2400%  100%   
Withdrawal order issued      4.6%           
Serious violation discovered
6  30.6%           
High degree of operator negligence   4.9%           
violation discovered 
Withdrawal order issued for a   2.4%           
serious violation  
 
D.  Safety Enforcement Activities per Mine per Quarter (Observations = 80,592) 
Number of inspections     4.612  3  4.999  0  78  
Number of inspections with a   1.855  1  2.132  0  30  
monetary penalty 
Average initial fine per inspection  $1,263  $431  $4,409  $26  $373,494   
with fine ($2002)
7 
Reduction of fine from initial level
7  16.2%  0  35.4%  -1250%  100%   
Number of inspections with a   0.211  0  0.581  0  16 
withdrawal order 
Number of inspections with a  1.410  1  1.821  0  25 
serious violation 
Number of inspections with a high   0.227  0  0.594  0  14 
degree of operator negligence violation      30
 
E.  Safety Enforcement Activities Per Mine per Quarter, Excluding Nonserious Violations (Observations = 
80,592) 
Number of inspections  with a   1.409  1  1.820  0  25 
monetary penalty 
Number of inspections with a   0.108  0  0.429  0  11 
withdrawal order 
Average initial fine per inspection   $1,442  $515  $4,664  $26  $378,847 
with fine ($2002)
8 
Reduction of fine from initial level
8  17.2%  0%  36.0%  -806%  100% 
Number of inspections with a high  0.184  0  0.534  0  13 
degree of operator negligence violation 
 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations. 
 
1 Excludes the 13,545 citations failing to report the degree of operator negligence.    
2 Statistics are calculated for the 22,000 withdrawal orders with an attached monetary penalty.   
3 Excludes the 14,083 withdrawal orders failing to report the degree of operator negligence. 
4 Excludes the 501 withdrawal orders lacking termination dates. 
5 Statistics are calculated for the 149,519 inspections imposing a monetary penalty. 
6 Monetary penalties were assessed on all inspections discovering a serious violation. 
7 We calculate the average by first totaling all monetary penalties for a given inspection.  Then for each mine in each 
quarter, we average the penalty per inspection across all inspections with penalties.  Statistics are generated for the 
67,594 nonzero observations. 
8 Averages are determined as described above excluding all nonserious violations.  Statistics are generated for the 
57,517 nonzero observations. 
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Table 2.  Variable Definitions and Summary Statistics 
 
Variable  Mean  Median  Standard 
Deviation 
Minimum  Maximum  Description 
Dependent Variable 
Injuries (totinj)  1.884  0  4.124  0  97  Number of lost-workday injuries including 
fatalities 
General Deterrence 
Average fine ($2002)   $1,706  $1,378  $1,261  $82  $24,707  Enforcement district average monetary penalty 
per inspection with monetary penalty 
Log average fine (lindamt)  7.222  7.229  0.675  4.411  10.115  Natural logarithm of average fine 
District inspections with fines 
(pennum) 
1.536  1.313  0.789  0  6.833  Enforcement district inspections with monetary 
penalties per mine 
District inspections with 
withdrawal orders (wonum) 
0.122  0.076  0.149  0  2.357  Enforcement district inspections with 
withdrawal orders per mine 
Specific abatement 
Inspections with fines (posnum)  1.633  1  2.076  0  25  Number of inspections with monetary penalties 
Inspections with withdrawal 
orders (sumwo) 
0.128  0  0.473  0  11  Number of inspections with withdrawal orders 
Mine Size 
Hours  36,927  12,965  61,514  1  875,668  Total employee hours worked 
Log hours (lhour)  9.474  9.470  1.585  0  13.683  Natural logarithm of hours 
Sample Size = 48,932 
 
Source:  Authors’ calculations 
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Figure 1  
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Figure 2 
Annual Fatalities Per Million Employee Hours 
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Figure 3 
Annual Nonfatal Disabling Injuries Per Million Employee Hours  
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Figure 4 
Quarterly Injuries Per Million Employee Hours in Estimation Sample 
Underground Bituminous Coal Mines, 1983:1–1997:4 
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